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1. A tension between ordinary and theoretical views
One of the central  questions of the ontology of  art  is  to which ontological  categories the 
different types of artworks – such as paintings, novels, pieces of musics, or etchings – belong 
to. The best answer to this question may then reveal whether all types of artworks belong to 
the  same  ontological  category;  and  perhaps  also  how  this  fact  may  be  related  to  their 
significance in our lives.
What I want to do in this paper is to begin to develop and render plausible – though not to 
fully assess or defend – a certain answer to this question, which involves the postulation of a 
somewhat new ontological category.1 I will be concerned solely with the ontology of novels. 
But I hope that much of what I will say will apply to other so-called repeatable forms of art, 
such as photographs, prints, other literary works, or pieces of music. Moreover, an important 
part of developing and rendering plausible the ontological view in question will be taken by 
the introduction and motivation of a fairly new outlook on the nature of sounds. 
As will become clear, this detour is partly motivated by the fact that answering the mentioned 
central question in the ontology of art has turned out to be no easy task. And one particularly 
important reason for this has been that there seems to be – as often enough in philosophical 
discussions  –  a  not  immediately  resolvable  tension  between  our  ordinary  opinions  and 
practices regarding the world, on the one hand, and our more theoretical understanding of 
the world, on the other. 
In the case of the ontology of the various types of artworks, the ordinary understanding in 
question is concerned with our commonly accepted and fairly pre-theoretical beliefs about the 
nature of these artworks, as well as with our typical treatment of and interaction with them; 
while the more theoretical understanding at issue deals with the more or less fundamental 
ontological categories, which the various more specific kinds of entity – such as artworks – are 
supposed to fall under.2
1 The view which I will put forward has its precedents in the work of Kaplan (1990), Alward (2004), 
Nudds (2007) and, to some extent, Levinson (1990), but has so farl failed to be widely discussed or 
even endorsed. Rohrbaugh (2003) seems to defend a very similar view, and in a similar way, but 
unfortunately I came across his article too late to be able to properly take it  into account here. 
Besides, it will very quickly become clear that I have considerably changed my mind about the nature 
of novels since writing the initial abstract for this article.
2 The distinction at issue is perhaps not that easy to be made,  given that our ordinary views may 
already  count  as  theories  of  some  kind,  while  our  ontological  views  may  include  or  be  heavily 
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More specifically, it is part of our ordinary understanding of artworks of particular types that 
they possess certain essential features. And this leads inevitably to a tension with the more 
theoretical view if none of the ontological categories deemed to be well-established allows for 
the simultaneous instantiation of all these features. That this tension indeed arises has been 
often noted (cf., e.g., Levinson (1990) and Thomasson (2004)); and I will come back to this 
issue in a moment. But before that, it will be helpful to consider first the consequences of this 
tension.
The most immediate inclination might perhaps be to conclude that artworks do not fit our 
ontological picture of the world. The idea is that, since they possess essential features, which 
are incompatible with belonging to any of the basic categories of entities, they should not be 
counted among the furniture of the world. But this conclusion is certainly unacceptable, and 
any inclination in its favour should be resisted. For artworks – as many other ordinary objects 
–  play  an  immensely  important  role  in  our  lives.  And  any  ontological  theory  failing  to 
accommodate them should prima facie be given up just for this reason. Ontological enquiry 
might  eventually  end  up  suggesting  that  none  of  the  best,  or  sufficiently  good,  available 
ontological theories can capture artworks in a satisfactory way. And this might then lead to 
scepticism either about the status of artworks as genuine or real entities, or, more generally, 
about the ontological project of finding out about the ontological categories making up the 
world. But the very strong suspicion would remain that something went wrong somewhere, 
and that a better approach to the ontology of artworks, as well as all other entities, is still 
there to be discovered. As often, scepticism constitutes only a last resort. 
 
Moreover,  it  seems  that  ontology  remains  rather  void  and  unilluminating  unless  it  is 
substantiated by explanatory links to entities which we commonly take to be part of the world, 
and which are of significance to our lives. For instance, there does not seem to be much point 
in being able to specify that properties are tropes, or that persons involve substances, if these 
insights would not help us to better understand, say, how properties can be possessed by 
objects,  or  be  response-dependent,  or  why  persons  can act,  be  loved,  or  have  conscious 
experiences.  Otherwise, if there are no criteria external to ontology for choosing between 
alternative ontological views, there is always the danger that ontology remains trapped in its 
own domain  and  ends up  being  not  much more  than a logical  game.  In  this  sense,  it  is 
important that ontology should try to accommodate those entities – such as artworks – which 
we ordinarily take to exist and to be of significance. It should therefore be tried to resolve the 
mentioned tension. 
Very generally, there are two independent, but possibly compatible ways in which this may 
happen. The more common approach has been to reject – or at least substantially modify – 
part of our ordinary understanding of artworks. Accordingly, it may be maintained that certain 
informed by our common beliefs about what exists. But I hope that the contrast drawn is none the 
less clear, and clear-cut, enough to ignore these issues.   
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of  the  features  of  artworks  in  question  are  not  really  essential  to  them;  and  that, 
correspondingly,  our  ordinary  view and practice  regarding  artworks,  or  our  philosophical 
understanding of this view and practice, are partly mistaken and in need of revision. But it 
may also be argued that it is instead (or in addition) our theoretical stance on ontological 
categories  that  has  to  be  changed  (cf.  Thomasson  (1999)  and  (2004)).  In  this  case,  the 
complaint will  very likely be that we have so far not recognized all  existing categories of 
entities and are in need to postulate one or more further categories, namely those required to 
theoretically capture the types of artworks under discussion, as they are described by our 
ordinary view on them.3
It should be clear that any revision of our basic ontological classifications is not a light matter 
and  therefore  needs  strong  motivation.  The  question  of  which  fundamental  categories  of 
entities  there  are  concerns  the  very  core  of  the  nature  of  our  world  and  has  important 
consequences on how we do or should conceive of the various more specific types of entities 
populating this world. So a substantial change in our answer to this question needs to be very 
well supported. But there are good reasons to think, it seems, that a tension with our ordinary 
view  of  artworks  provides  us  with  a  strong  motive  to  reconsider  and  possibly  alter  our 
respective ontological views. 
That artworks have to be ontologically accommodated as part of our world has already been 
mentioned. But it seems similarly undeniable that the primary criterion for the adequacy of an 
ontological  account  of  artworks  is  to  which  extent  it  captures  our  ordinary  opinions  and 
practices concerning art. First of all, artworks are human-made objects or artefacts, and they 
would not exist (at least not in their current forms) if there would not be any humans. But, 
more importantly, whether some object counts as an instance of art is not (or at least not 
clearly, and not always) a matter of some kind of specific function, such as to elicit pleasant 
experiences or educate the people (cf. Wollheim (1980), Davies (1991), and Wiggins (2001)). 
Instead,  what  seems  often,  if  not  always,  to  be  crucial  is  how the  object  in  question  is 
ordinarily experienced and treated by us and, more specifically, by artists, curators, critics, 
and so on. In particular, we may treat objects as artworks for very different reasons, which 
are too particular to allow proper systematisation – as both the failure of the various projects 
to define art and the realistic possibility of future art of a very different sort suggest. The 
underlying reason of this is perhaps that the aesthetic experiences and benefits differ from 
(type of) artwork to (type of) artwork. Medieval altarpieces are art for different reasons than 
3 Such new categories need not be more than modifications or sub-categories of  already accepted 
categories. But for reasons of simplicity, I will treat them simply as new categories. 
Note also that the revision of both our ordinary and our theoretical views can perhaps take two 
forms:  we may change the  ways  in  which we ordinarily  or  theoretically  understand  the  entities 
concerned;  or  we  may  change  the  ways  in  which  we  philosophically  capture  these  ordinary  or 
theoretical views. For instance, we may be wrong about the common-sense idea that artworks are 
created in two ways: we may err because artworks are not created, after all; or we may err in our 
previous description of what it means, according to common-sense, for an artwork to be created. But 
again, these further divisions will be irrelevant for what follows, and I will therefore ignore them.
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conceptual  artworks  perhaps  partly  because  of  considerable  differences  in  our  aesthetic 
experiences  of  and  interactions  with  them.  Perhaps  what  ultimately  counts  is  whether 
artworks possess some, or a certain kind of, aesthetic value (though one problem here is that 
there seems to be bad, that is, aesthetically defective or worthless art). But even then, our 
experience and treatment of them – or at least the experience and treatment of sufficiently 
competent people,  or of  later  and distanced generations (cf.  Hume's famous essay on the 
standards of taste, as well as the very end of Wollheim (1987)) – will presumably reflect this 
special  value  and,  hence,  their  status  as  artworks.  But  if  which  objects  are,  or  are  not, 
artworks is determined or reflected by how we normally see them, both in opinion and in 
practice,  the  latter  presumably  also  determines  or  reflects  the  particular  features  which 
characterise the artworks – namely both the features because of which they count as art, and 
the  features  which  characterise  their  more  specific  ways  of  being  art.  Indeed,  it  seems 
difficult to imagine a plausible situation in which our ordinary view is typically right about 
which objects are art, but also usually wrong about their nature and about what it means for 
them to be art.
This still leaves open the possibility that not all aspects of our ordinary understanding of art is 
relevant  or  appropriate  and  therefore  should  be  preserved,  no  matter  what.  But  the 
considerations just presented provide us with a good motive to hold on to this understanding 
as much as possible and treat it at least as equal in this respect as our theoretical view on the 
basic  ontological  categories  of  the  entities  in  the  world.  So  both  ways  of  resolving  any 
potential tension between our ordinary and our theoretical views regarding the ontology of 
artworks enjoy considerable initial plausibility; and which of them to choose will not be an 
easy matter to be decided.
But, in any case, what could possibly decide this issue? There will clearly be certain core 
aspects of our ordinary view on artworks which should be taken as unrevisable – such as the 
idea that there are artworks, or that they are, in some sense at least, created or made by 
artists. Is there any similar limit on our ontological theory and, notably, on which fundamental 
categories it accepts (apart from more formal criteria, such as consistency and intelligibility)? 
Ockham's principle may very well be relevant in our choice of ontology: we should perhaps 
indeed try to assume as few categories as possible. But this restriction is not absolute. It may 
help us to choose between several theories, which postulate different numbers of ontological 
categories, but are otherwise equivalent (e.g., with respect to their accommodation of our 
ordinary views on the matter). But it cannot as such speak for or against a theory, evaluated 
on its own. And, as a consequence, it may be outweighed by other considerations, such as 
whether  the  core  –  or  perhaps  even the  peripheral  –  aspects  of  our  ordinary  views  and 
practices are adequately accommodated.4 So the dialectical situation seems to be as follows: if 
4 Another problem is that it is not clear whether Ockham's desideratum is really best satisfied solely by 
keeping the number of different categories as low as possible, or also, or instead, say, by keeping the 
nature of those categories as simple or intelligible as possible. And it may be part of keeping one's 
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the tension involves core aspects of our ordinary understanding of artworks, it is our ontology 
which needs to be revised; otherwise, we have to weigh the various conflicting parts of our 
two views on the world and, on the basis of this, decide which to give up. 
Whether  much can be gained  by  this  strategy  will  primarily  depend on whether  we can 
become sufficiently clear on which aspects of our ordinary understanding of artworks should 
be taken to be unrevisable. This need not require, however, that we have to be able to tell 
apart all core aspects of our understanding from all peripheral ones. For as long as we are 
able to identify some specific features of certain types of artworks, which we cannot seriously 
take to be non-essential to them, even though we cannot further explain why this should be 
so, we may have already enough to rule out certain views on the ontological categorisation of 
those artworks, and to opt for alternative – and possibly less sparse – ones instead. And as the 
examples mentioned above suggest already, it seems indeed possible to identify some of the 
core features of artworks. None the less, whether an aspect of our ordinary view on artworks 
is central in that a satisfactory ontology of artworks cannot fail to capture them may very well 
be a matter of degree. And, more importantly perhaps, which respective features of artworks 
are involved here (and therefore really essential  to them) may very well  differ among the 
various forms of art, and perhaps even among examples of the same form of art.
It might be thought that a much more straightforward line of reasoning speaks for resolving 
the tension in favour of our ordinary understanding of artworks. For it might be maintained, in 
the spirit  of  Quine's  writings,  that,  very roughly,  whether certain kinds and categories of 
entities exist is solely a matter of which such kinds and categories our best theories quantify 
over and thereby assume to exist. And in the light of the immense importance of our ordinary 
views on art for the occurrence and nature of artworks, it appears plausible to suggest that 
these views come very close to the best account which we can provide of artworks (at least, 
there do not seem to be any serious, more theoretical alternatives). However, not only is this 
approach to ontology generally controversial  (cf.,  e.g., Lowe (1998) for a more substantial 
account of existence). But it seems more specifically problematic with respect to artworks 
precisely  because  they  are  so  much  dependent  on  our  intentionality  and  activity  (cf. 
Thomasson (2004)).  It  may be the case that we should rely on the results of  the natural 
sciences in deciding which entities there are, and perhaps also to which ontological categories 
they belong. But the same approach seems far less plausible if entities are concerned the 
existence and nature of  which is determined or reflected primarily by what we ordinarily 
believe or do. This way of understanding the world – perhaps in contrast to the scientific way 
of understanding it – does not obviously appear to be of the right kind as to warrant by itself 
taking its postulations of entities ontologically at face value. It seems that more needs to be 
said  to  justify  the  claim  that  our  common  beliefs  about  artworks  correspond  to  the 
fundamental ontological structure of the world, even if assuming that some of our scientific 
ontology  simple  and intelligible  that  its  explanation  of  the  nature  of  artworks,  as  we ordinarily 
conceive of it, is simple and intelligible.
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beliefs do.
However,  there  would  indeed  be  some  support  for  the  postulation  of  new  ontological 
categories in response to our ordinary views on art, if there are other types of entities the 
(most) adequate account of which strongly suggest the introduction of the same categories. 
And, as I will argue below, this is just what happens if we consider the ontology of sounds and 
compare it with that of novels.
Here is how I will proceed. First of all, I will try to specify five features ordinarily ascribed to 
novels  and  motivate  the  idea  that  they  are  essential  to  them,  so  that  any  satisfactory 
ontological account of novels should be able to accommodate them. Then, I will discuss and 
reject the identification of novels either with (sums or sets of) concrete entities, or with types 
or kinds. After that, I will briefly assess two recently proposed modifications of the latter view 
by  Levinson  and  Thomasson.  My  conclusion  will  be  that  especially  Thomasson's  account 
contains promising aspects which, however, are in need of more development. To spell out the 
emerging view in more detail,  I will  switch my attention to the case of sounds and try to 
motivate and formulate an ontology which understands them as prototypes, that is, a special 
sort of temporal universals. In the final section, I will return to novels and apply to them my 
conclusions about sounds
2. Some essential features of novels
Above, I have already mentioned some core aspects of our ordinary understanding of novels 
as artworks: namely that there indeed are novels, and that they are created or written by 
some of us. In what follows, I want to identify five further aspects of our view on novels, which 
I take to be central to our understanding in the sense that giving them up in response to more 
theoretical worries should count as giving up on the idea of novels as such. I hope that the 
accompanying considerations will make it sufficiently plausible that this is really how it is.
Novels are the creations of writers. Part of what this means is that novels are temporal: they 
do not exist forever, but come into existence at certain moments in time and may afterwards 
again cease to exist. The novel  Ulysses, for instance, did not exist before Joyce sat down to 
write it. And although it still exists, there are presumably many other novels (or other literary 
works)  which  have  not  survived  until  today.  The  coming  into  existence  of  novels  is 
(presumably)  a  temporally  extended process.  And it  is  surely  often difficult,  and perhaps 
sometimes even impossible,  to specify a particular point in time precisely at which novels 
acquire existence. But none the less,  there are certain moments in time after which they 
clearly are in existence (e.g., after their first publication). Mirroring the process of creation is 
the  process  of  destruction.  Novels  may,  and  often  enough  do,  go  out  of  existence.  This 
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happens especially if all their written or printed copies and all printing plates or other means 
of reproduction are destroyed, and all memories concerning their concrete content or order of 
words are erased.5 Again, the process of going out of existence may be temporally extended – 
for instance when the copies of a novel are destroyed one after the other, instead of all at the 
same time. And as before, it may not be easy to determine when exactly a certain novel has 
ceased to exist. But for any completely lost novel, there are specific moments in time after 
which it is clearly not in existence any more. 
Novels are also multiply realisable (or repeatable). What this notion is intended to capture is 
the often noted capacity of kinds, types, universals, numbers, and so on, to be – in some sense 
– 'wholly present'  in several distinct examples, instances, tokens, and so on. In particular, 
multiple realisability is meant to differ from spatial  scatteredness, that is, the property of 
having several spatial and possibly disconnected parts at different locations. Here is not the 
place to give the notion of multiple realisability its full meaning, so it suffices perhaps to say 
that  being multiply  realisable  means,  roughly,  being able  to  fully  occur  simultaneously  at 
different places and by means, or in the form, of distinct realising entities. In the case of 
novels, the realising entities in the case of novels may be either physical or mental copies of 
the novel – such as manuscripts, printed copies, sequences of spoken words, or memories (as 
in  Truffaut's  Fahrenheit  451).  Often,  the  relation  of  realisation  takes  on  the  form  of 
instantiation or exemplification –  as in the case of properties or  kinds.  But this need not 
always  be  so,  as  perhaps  the  example  of  types  and  possibly  also  of  novels  and  other 
repeatable artworks show. Besides, multiply realisable entities do not seem to possess spatial 
locations, or at least not in the same sense as normal material entities. The novel Ulysses is 
not located where it has been written; nor is it located at the scattered sum of all the places at 
which there currently are copies or means of reproduction. At best, the novel might be said to 
be multiply  spatially located:  that  is,  to  be wholly  located at  different locations in space, 
namely at each of the locations of its copies or means of reproduction. This way of talking 
might make sense partly because each of these concrete entities suffice for the existence of 
the novel and render it fully accessible or reproducible. But even then, novels would not be 
spatially located in the same way as concrete entities. Novels cannot be 'in the drawer' in the 
same manner in which manuscripts of novels may be.
The multiple realisability of novels has direct consequences for their persistence conditions. 
First of all, the existence of a single copy – and, in fact, of any copy, and not of any special or 
privileged one (such as the original manuscript) – is sufficient for the existence of a novel. 
This means also that the existence of no particular copy – again not even of any special or 
privileged one – is necessary for the existence of a given novel. As long as there is one or the 
other copy – even if it is only a mental one –, the novel exists. And the novel may survive the 
destruction of any particular copies. Indeed, it seems plausible to say that it can survive the 
5 It is debatable whether memorising a novel in its entirety constitutes the creation of a mental copy of 
the novel, or rather only the creation of means for recreating such copies.
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disappearance of all copies. For if, for example, the printing plates still remain in existence, it 
would seem odd to say that the novel does not exist any more, or has been lost. In particular, 
if a new copy is printed with the use of the plates, it is not as if the novel has been recreated 
or rewritten. Instead, simply a new copy has been reproduced. Accordingly, the existence of 
relevant reproduction means is already sufficient for the existence of novels.
In  addition,  novels  are  individuals  in  the  sense that  they enjoy  continuous  existence  and 
possess (fairly) determinate individuation criteria. Two authors who, independently of each 
other, come up with exactly the same sequences of words will (if at all) end up writing two 
numerically distinct novels, even though they need not be any qualitative differences among 
the two novels or any of their copies. Some writer in Australia might have happened to write a 
book just  like  Ulysses,  but  without  knowing anything about  Joyce and his  work.  And the 
resulting novel would not have been the same as the one written by Joyce.6 In particular, we 
would have assessed its aesthetic merit in a different way than the aesthetic value of Joyce's 
book. In contrast, to the extent to which someone reproduces the work of another (e.g., by 
copying or translating it), the result will count as (part of) the same novel, though possibly in 
a different guise. Of course, we value the work of copyists and translators of novels, but we 
typically do not credit them with having written a new literary work.7 So what seems to be 
relevant for the particular identity of novels is the nature of the act of writing in which they 
originate.  Their  qualitative  features,  on  the  other  hand,  seem far  less  important.  As  the 
possibility of two independently written works illustrates, distinct novels (or copies thereof) 
may resemble each other perfectly with respect to their linguistic content; while the many 
copies of one and the same novel may differ considerably, due to printing mistakes, omissions, 
censure, deliberate alterations by the author or editor, choice of printing material and style, 
and so on. For instance,  Ulysses has occurred in many different versions, its various copies 
have involved different kinds of paper, spelling and layout, as well as different errors or cuts, 
and some of them have covered only part of the novel. It might not be easy to fully specify the 
individuation criteria for novels. But it seems difficult to deny that they possess some.
Novels are, finally, accessible: they can be read, listened to, understood, and enjoyed. And our 
access to them is mediated by our access to particular copies of them. Without the perception 
– and, hence, the presence – of a copy, we cannot access a novel. It is less clear, however, 
whether this renders novels themselves perceivable (and causally efficacious).  Perhaps we 
instead grasp them more like we grasp meanings. None the less, it appears that novels are, at 
least in principle, publicly accessible. Just as there are presumably no private meanings, there 
are no private novels (while, of course, a novel may exist only within the mind of the writer).
6 Borges' case of Menard rewriting Don Quixote is perhaps different. Since Maynard knew Cervantes' 
novel and actually set out to recreate it, it is not clear whether he thereby rewrote the same novel as 
Cervantes, or a new one. 
7 That this may very well be different in the case of poetry provides further support for the idea that 
poetry is, to some extent, untranslatable.
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3. Novels as (sets or sums of) concrete entities
Taking these essential features of novels serious requires rejecting their identification with 
concrete entities, or sets or sums thereof.8 That is, our ordinary understanding of novels does 
not fit  with taking them to fall  under the ontological category of concrete entities.  These 
entities – such as tables or, indeed, copies of novels – are characterised by the fact that they 
possess temporality and spatiality, but lack multiple realisability, as described above.9 If at all, 
they are realised, and realisable, by only a single concrete entity, namely themselves. This 
already  suffices  to  resist  the  identification  of  particular  novels  with  particular  concrete 
entities. As indicated above, the persistence of conditions of the two types of entity are just 
too different, and this is the result of the difference in realisability. It does not help much to 
identify novels with the set or sum of certain or all their copies – whether these involve only 
current or also past and future copies. One motivation for this view might be that it promises 
to capture the multiple realisability, at least if the set or sum of all (current) copies is selected. 
But  again,  it  does  not  fit  the  persistence  conditions  of  novels.  First  of  all,  all  plausible 
candidates for the sets or sums to be identified with novels will presumably include as their 
essential members or parts some current copies and will therefore cease to exist, once one of 
these copies is destroyed; but novels may survive such a destruction of a single copy. And, 
furthermore, if the sets or sums comprise in fact all past, present and future copies, they will 
not even come into existence until the last copy is created (and all the others still remain in 
existence); while novels clearly do not count as incomplete or even non-existent unless this 
condition is met.10 In short, the multiple realisability of novels has the consequence that no 
particular (set or sum of) copies are specially privileged in relation to the existence of the 
novels.  New copies  may always come into  being,  while  old  copies  may always  go out  of 
existence. And both facts ensure that, typically, the existence or non-existence of no specific 
copy has any special bearing on the persistence of novels. 
4. Novels as types or kinds
In the light of these problems, many philosophers have instead tried to identify novels with 
universals, such as types or kinds (cf. Wollheim (1980), Wolterstorff (1980), Currie 1988), and 
8 Further below,  I  will  consider whether  novels  might  be identified with types or kinds.  I  assume 
thereby that sets or sums differ from types or kinds in that  the former are constituted by their 
members or parts, while the latter are realised by them. One consequence of this is that, since types 
and kinds are mulitiply realisable, none of the realising entities is required for them to exist – at least 
not unless it is the last existing one. By contrast, sets and sums go out of existence as soon as one of 
their members or parts cease to exist. Besides, classes are presumably more like types and kind, than 
like sums and sets, and should receive the appropriate treatment.
9 They are also characterised by the fact that their existence does not depend on the simultaneous 
(though perhaps the prior) existence of  other concrete entities.  In this respect,  concrete entities 
differ from tropes and other dependant entities, which I will discuss below.
10 A further problem for the identification either with concrete copies or with sets or sums thereof is 
that novels seem to be able to exist even if no physical or mental copy exists – for instance, if only the 
printing plates or files are left. 
9
Kivy (1993)).11 For universals differ from concrete entities precisely in that they are multiple 
realisable.  However,  traditionally,  they  also  have  been  taken  to  be  non-temporal.  As  a 
consequence,  if  novels really were types or kinds,  they could  not count  as  created.  Here 
again, we have the tension between some of our ordinary views on art and the attempt to rely 
on traditional  ontological  categories to capture art.  The resulting problme has sometimes 
been countered with the idea that novels – perhaps just like other repeatable works of art – 
are discovered rather than created. But even if this rather and seemingly desperate move can 
be legitimated12, there is the further and potentially deeper problem that novels have more 
fine-grained individuation conditions than types or kinds. Again, if two independently working 
authors  write  exactly  the  same sequence  of  sentences,  their  novels  should  still  count  as 
numerically distinct.  But if the non-temporal types or kinds in question are not defined in 
terms of sequences of words, it is unclear in terms of which aspects of novels they might be 
specified instead.13
It might be attempted to solve at least the first problem by taking the respective types or 
kinds to be temporal – say, by characterising them in relation to the property of being created 
at a certain moment of time and by a certain method. This view may thereby be modelled on 
the  temporal  understanding  of  properties,  which  treats  them as  existing  only  if  they  are 
actually instantiated (cf. the notion of Aristotelian universals), or only if there is something 
which either possesses or lacks them (cf. Wolterstorff (1980)). Applied to types or kinds, the 
thought  might  then be that  they exist  as  well  only  if  they  are actually  realised  by some 
example or instance. Then, they could still count as created: they come into being once their 
first  example comes into being,  and if  the latter  is  an artefact  produced by us,  they will 
thereby created. But it is not clear how this could help to solve the second problem. The 
challenge is now to specify the sense in which the two qualitatively (or at least linguistically) 
identical, but numerically distinct novels constitute distinct types or kinds. They both might 
be created at the same time and by using the same means, so their origins will at best differ in 
relation to the author involved and the spatial location of his or her activity of writing. So, in 
contrast to Aristotelian universals, their identity would depend partly on certain aspects of the 
origin of their first realiser. 
11 I will ignore attempts to identify artworks with mental or imaginary entities (cf. Collingwood's and 
Sartre's views) The postulation of non-concrete entities, such as universals, has often come under 
attack. If it really turns out that there are no such entities, or that they can be reduced to concrete 
entities,  and  that  talk  about  non-concrete  entities  has  to  be  spelled  out  in  terms of  talk  about 
concrete entities, I hope that the following considerations may be easily translated. The idea is that, 
even if talk about ('normal') concrete entities and talk about non-concrete entities refer ultimately to 
entities of one and the same ontological category, there is an important distinction between these two 
ways of talking and the respective two kinds of entities. However, in this case, the central question 
raised above would have to be slightly reformulated, as concerning very basic kinds of the single 
ontological category accepted, rather than as concerning several ontological categories.
12 See, for instance, Levinson (1990) for its many problems.
13 It might be suggested that the respective types or kinds are to be characterised in relation to the 
property of being created at a certain moment of  time and by a certain method. But this would 
presumably render the types or kinds temporal – an option which I will discuss 
10
But  this  would  be  in  tension  with  at  least  one  natural  understanding  of  types  or  kinds, 
according  to  which  their  identity  is  a  matter  of  the  nature  of  those  properties  which 
something has to possess in order to count as an example of the type or kind in question (cf. 
Wolterstorff  (1980)).  The type or kind 'horse' differs from the type or kind 'dog' precisely 
because they correspond to different properties – being a horse and being a dog, respectively 
– which are characteristic of their examples or instances. But the same could not be true of 
those types or kinds identical with novels. The property which is supposed to individuate them 
– namely the property of being created by this author at that time – is not shared by most of 
their copies, and need not be shared by any of their still existing copies. Indeed, it becomes 
mysterious in virtue of which features entities would count as copies of a novel, and of this 
novel rather than that, given that most copies are not produced by the author, and not at the 
original time of creation. So, if there is no better way of understanding why novels and horses 
should be both classified as types or kinds, it seems that this classification should be dropped 
with respect to novels: if they are indeed universals, they are not types or kinds. Besides, the 
persistence  conditions  of  novels  would  still  differ  from the  persistence  conditions  of  the 
proposed temporal types or kinds. For while a novel may remain in existence even if all of its 
copies are destroyed (e.g., if there still are the relevant printing plates), the temporal types or 
kinds would presumably cease to exist, once all their examples have disappeared. And the 
suggestion  that  all  means  of  reproduction  should,  too,  count  as  examples  of  the  novels 
remains again mysterious unless it is clarified what turns them into copies of novels.
The problems for the views which take novels to be types or kinds can also not be avoided by 
maintaining that our ordinary talk about novels to be ambiguous between talk about the types 
or kinds involved and talk about their examples or instances. Surely, our talk about novels is 
often imprecise or elliptical, as when we speak of 'buying, owning or borrowing Ulysses', or 
when saying 'this is Joyce's novel' while pointing to a copy of  Ulysses. And these examples 
may indeed be taken to illustrate the kind of ambiguity proposed: in the first, we mean to talk 
about a particular copy of the novel,  but seem to talk about the novel itself;  while in the 
second, we mean to talk about the novel, but seem to talk about a particular copy of it. So, the 
idea might be, 'novels' are temporal in so far as they are copies and hence concrete entities, 
while they are multiply realisable in so far as they are (non-temporal) types or kinds – for 
instance, those identified in terms of sequences of words. But there would still be the problem 
of how to distinguish qualitatively identical novels which have been independently written by 
different authors. Talk about this difference seems to involve talk about novels which cannot 
be interpreted either as talk about concrete entities or as talk about types or kinds, for the 
same reasons as considered above. And moreover, treating only the concrete copies of novels 
as temporal, while treating only the related, but distinct types or kinds as multiply realisable, 
would still amount to a substantial revision of our ordinary understanding of novels.
11
5. Levinson's view: novels as 'indicated types'
Levinson has mainly worked on the ontology of music (cf. Levinson (1990)), but the general 
line of his proposal can be easily transferred to a theory of novels. According to his view, 
novels will  be 'indicated types'.  These are created entities which are constituted by three 
elements: a non-temporal type, the creating subject, and the respective time of creation. In 
the case of novels, the three elements are the ordered sequence of words (or some structure 
very like it), the author, and the time of his or her writing the novel. Novels, understood as 
such 'indicated types', therefore come into existence only once an act of writing has occurred. 
By contrast, the relevant types of ordered sequences of words exist prior to the novels – in 
fact, they exist eternally. Thus, Levinson has no problem to account for some aspects of the 
temporality and persistence of novels. And he can also explain why different acts of writing 
lead to different novels, even if they result in novels with exactly the same order of words.
But, as often been noted (cf., e.g., Currie (1988), Kivy (1993), and Alward (2004)), his account 
faces some serious problems. One of them is that it is not clear whether 'indicated types' 
should  really  count  as  entities  in  their  own  right  –  and  created  ones,  for  that  matter. 
According  to  Levinson,  they  are  created  either  by  producing  an  example  of  them,  or  by 
generating instructions or means of producing such examples. But we often produce concrete 
entities which realise or instantiate some universal, without this resulting in the production of 
a new entity, over and above the already existing universal, creator and event of creation. In 
particular, in writing  Ulysses, Joyce produced objects which exemplified shapes and colours 
(e.g., the signs on paper), but we are not inclined to say that he thereby created new entities, 
namely  'indicated'  (i.e.,  time-  and person-indexed)  'shapes'  or  'colours',  which differ  from 
normal shape and colour properties. So Levinson's account seems to be much closer to a view 
which takes our talk about novels to be really talk about two other entities – events of creation 
and ordered sequences of words – and their relation to each other. And furthermore, it is 
difficult to see how 'indicated types' go out of existence. The passing of the event of creation, 
or the death of author, clearly do not cause the respective 'indicated type' to cease to exist as 
well. But since the existence of no other entities is important for the existence of 'indicated 
types', they seem unable to go out of existence, once created. Novels, however, clearly can 
disappear again. So we should not identify novels with 'indicated types', or even treat the 
latter as genuine entities over and above mere mereological sums.
6. Thomasson's view: novels as 'abstract artifacts'
Thomasson,  by  contrast,  tries  to  capture  repeatable  forms  of  art,  such  as  novels,  by 
introducing the ontological category of 'abstract artifacts' (cf. Thomasson (1999) and (2004)). 
More  generally,  examples  of  'abstract  artifacts'  are  cultural  or  social  entities  (e.g.,  laws, 
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institutions,  and  reproducible  artworks)  and  technical  inventions  or  kinds  (e.g.,  the 
telephone). And they are characterised by the following features. 
First, they are multiply realisable and thus can have several examples, copies or instances. 
Second, and in part as a result, they lack spatial location.14 Third, they do not exist 'eternally' 
or 'necessarily', but possess temporal features: they come into existence, may change and may 
cease to exist. And fourth, part of the explanation of this is that their existence requires the 
existence of  certain  concrete  entities.  This  form of  ontological  dependence comes in  two 
forms. On the one hand, 'abstract artifacts' depend for their existence on the prior existence 
of some concrete entities responsible for their  creation – notably human beings and their 
intentional actions or states. The latter need thereby exist only during, or just prior of, the 
creation of the 'abstract artifacts': that is, the created 'abstract artifacts' may survive their 
creators. And while some 'abstract artifacts' may depend in this way on particular creators 
and their  particular  acts  of  creation  (e.g.,  works of  art),  others  may depend only  on the 
existence of some or another creator and act of creation (e.g., telephones). On the other hand, 
'abstract artifacts' depend for their existence on the simultaneous existence of some concrete 
entities responsible for their persistence – notably concrete physical examples, but possibly 
also concrete mental examples (e.g., complete memories of them). This time, the particular 
identity of the concrete entities in question does not matter: 'abstract artifacts' never depend 
on particular examples (e.g., the first existing telephone), but instead exist as long as there is 
still some example. Relatedly, 'abstract artifacts' have gone out of existence once all examples 
have disappeared or been destroyed. 
Applied to novels, Thomasson's view seems to capture well both their multiple realisability 
and their temporality. But it still raises some important issues and questions. First of all, it 
needs to be slightly modified, given that novels may exist even in the absence of any copy of 
them, as long as there are still means of producing such copies (e.g., due to the presence of 
printing plates,  or  computer files).  But the fact  that  Thomasson is  not  explicit  about this 
possibility seems to have some deeper implications, for it leaves certain aspects of her theory 
underdeveloped. One case in point is that her view leaves it open how 'abstract artifacts' are 
realised by their examples. It seems that the relation of realisation in question is not one of 
instantiation or exemplification, as in the case of properties, types or kinds. But more needs to 
be said to provide the view here with substance. And just as in the case of Levinson's view, 
there is  again the question of  how novels  may actually  cease to  exist:  that  is,  how their 
dependence on authors and their acts of writing has the consequence that novels go out of 
14 Thomasson also claims that they are 'abstract' in the sense that they lack spatio-temporal features. 
However, since they are still temporal, she seems to take lack of spatiality as the main criterion for 
'abstractness' here. However, mental episodes would then count as 'abstract' entities as well. In my 
view, it seems more plausible to (positively or negatively) define 'abstractness' in terms of features 
which all concrete entities either possess or lack. Accordingly, some entities may count as 'abstract' 
because  they  are  non-temporal  (e.g.,  Platonic  universals),  while  others  may  count  as  'abstract' 
because they are multiple realisable (e.g., universals in general), and even further ones because they 
are dependants in the sense specified (e.g., tropes).
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existence once all copies and means of reproduction do. The link between the two kinds of 
dependence noted by Thomasson needs still  to  be spelled out.  However,  while Levinson's 
account seems to leave no room for a satisfactory solution (as he has implicitly acknowledged 
himself), Thomasson's view seems again to suffer only from being a bit underdeveloped.
7. The essential features of sounds
To answer the questions about the nature of the realisation relation between novels and their 
copies and about the persistence and potential destruction of novels, and, more generally, to 
get a grip on the nature of the ontological category to which novels seem to belong, it will 
perhaps be helpful to attend for a moment to the parallel and instructive case of sounds. My 
starting point will be a couple of central observations concerning the identity and persistence 
of sounds.15
The first is that, if we listen to a recording of a concert, we hear the same individual sounds as 
the people who attended the concert. This is just the function of auditory reproductions: to 
preserve as best as possible the original sounds and to provide us with access to them even 
long after their initial production.16 The two events – the first production of the sounds by the 
orchestra and their reproduction by, say, the record player – typically do not resemble each 
other perfectly, but may differ in respect of the nature of the vibrating object, their specific 
vibrations, the specific waves which these vibrations bring about, the medium in which these 
waves occur, and so on. In fact, the differences may sometimes be quite stark, as in the case 
of a very low quality recording of a badly mixed concert. But even if hardly any resemblance is 
recognisable,  the  recording still  counts  as  reproducing the original  sounds,  as  long as  it 
stands in the right kind of relation to the initial event of production.17 This remains true even 
15 I rely here on a suggestion by Mike Martin.  His ideas on sounds are also picked up and briefly 
discussed in Nudds (2007). They have originally been motivated by the work on the ontology of works 
in Kaplan (1990).
16 Martin seems to think that the same does not hold true of reproductions of visible objects, such as 
photographs of people. In his view, when we look at a photograph of a person, we do not see the 
person, but only the photograph. This may be supported or explained in at least two ways: our failure 
to see the person may be due to the fact that the person is not the direct object of our perception; or 
it may be due to the fact that the photograph itself does not represent a particular person, but only a 
type of a person (while any particularity has to be external to the photographic content, say, imposed 
by the intention of the photographer, or the title of the picture). But if one prefers Walton's account of 
photographs  as  being  'transparent  windows'  onto  what  is  photographed  (cf.  Walton  (1994)), 
photographic reproductions put us into contact with the very same objects as the visual perceptions 
of the spectators present at the original  scene. One important issue is here to which ontological 
category the appearances recorded by photographs belong to (and whether it is the same as that of 
sounds): that is,  whether they are either merely properties of perceivable objects, or perceivable 
invididuals in their own right. Martin's idea is that appearances, unlike sounds, are not particulars. 
And the same seems true of reproductions of, say, paintings, even if they are generated, not via some 
printing technology, but by actually copying them with real paint. We then do not see the original 
painting, but only its copy (which may furthermore count as a distinct artwork in its own right). The 
important issue appears here to be which entities we can and do perceive directly.
17 In the case of auditory reproductions, the presence of two distinct processes seems to be required for 
the obtainment of the right kind of link between produced and reproduced sounds: the process of 
recording and the process of replaying. In the case of artworks, these processes will often be very 
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if what we hear (or what is involved, such as the vibrations, waves and auditory experiences) 
when we listen to the recording resembles much more what we hear (or what is involved) 
when we listen to a concert distinct from the recorded one. That is, if we listen to a recording 
and recognise what we hear to be more similar to what we have heard at one concert rather 
than at another, the recording still reproduces the individual sounds heard at the latter if it is 
a recording of that concert, and not of the former. So, what matters for whether the same 
individual sounds or distinct ones are heard is not the degree of resemblance in the physical 
or  experiential  properties concerned,  but instead whether they ultimately originate in the 
same or in distinct events of sound production. 
This captures also the second observation that, when two subjects attend different concerts or 
listen to the respective reproductions, they hear distinct individual sounds. And again, this 
remains true, even if the same piece of music is played by the same performers and in the 
same way; and even if, as a result, the are physical features of the vibrations or waves and the 
experiential or representational qualities of the auditory experiences are (more or less) the 
same in both cases.
Now,  if  these  observations  and  considerations  are  indeed  correct,  sounds  seem  to  be 
characterised  by  the  following  features.  First,  they  are  individual  in  the  sense  that  they 
possess determinate individuation criteria.18 More specifically, they are to be individuated by 
reference to their origin in particular events of sound production or reproduction, and not by 
reference to their qualitative features, or the qualitative features of any of the closely related 
entities, such as vibrations, waves, or auditory experiences. In particular, the same individual 
sound can possess different sound qualities or be linked to qualitatively different vibrations, 
waves or experiences, and distinct sounds can possess identical sound qualities or be linked 
to  qualitatively  identical  vibrations,  waves  or  experiences.  Second,  sounds  are  intimately 
connected to the relevant physical entities involved in the (re)production of sounds (such as 
the vibrating sources of sounds, the caused and spreading waves, the respective events of 
vibrating,  causing  or  spreading,  or  the  total  events  of  sound  (re)production)  in  that  the 
(re)production of sounds – that is, the (re)occurrence of sounds in such a way that they can 
actually be heard – requires the presence of physical entities of such types.19 If no objects 
vibrate and no waves are thereby caused to occur in a certain medium, there will no sounds to 
be heard by us.  Third,  sounds are multiply realisable by such physical  entities:  the same 
individual sound can (re)occur and be hearable in the context of numerically and qualitatively 
very different  sources,  vibrations,  waves,  and  so  on  –  notably  simultaneously  at  different 
similar: print-making and printing in the case of prints; or preparing printing plates and printing in 
the (old-fashioned) case of novels. It might however not always be so easy to distinguish the proper 
from the deviant processes.
18 See further below on the issue of whether, or in which sense, sounds also enjoy continuous existence.
19 The auditory experiences seem to be less relevant here. Even if  the existence of sounds is more 
generally dependent on our capacity to hear them (just as colours seem to depend on our capacity to 
see  them),  sounds  will  be  public  in  the  sense  of  not  being  dependent  on  particular  auditory 
experiences. 
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places (e.g., when people listen independently of each other to distinct recordings of the same 
concert).  And  fourth,  sounds  possess  temporal  features.  Because  of  their  dependence  on 
events of sound production, they do not exist before the occurrence of these events, but come 
into existence only during, and in virtue of, them. Moreover, because of their reproducibility, 
individual sounds may survive – or at least reoccur – as long as their reproduction is still 
possible (e.g., if there are still recordings, or perhaps memories, of them). That is, given the 
means  of  reproduction,  we  can  listen  to  one  and  the  same  sound  long  after  its  original 
production. But once all events of production and reproduction are over, and all recordings 
and similar means of reproduction destroyed, the corresponding sounds cease to exist. This 
leaves open the question of whether sounds continue to exist in the intervals between the 
various events of (re)production, or whether they literally reoccur each time they are again 
reproduced after such an interval. Anew, I will return to this issue below.
8. Sounds as prototypes
If sounds really possess these features, they should not be taken to belong to the ontological 
categories  already  mentioned.  Obviously,  they  cannot  be  properties  because  of  their 
individuality, or non-temporal universals because of their temporality.20 They also cannot be 
identical with the relevant qualitative temporal types or kinds, that is, those temporal types or 
kinds which are individuated – that is, the examples of which are identified – in relation to 
some of the qualitative properties of the physical entities or auditory experienced at issue. 
For, as already noted, sounds are not to be individuated by reference to such qualities. And, 
finally,  they  cannot  be  identified  with  any  (sets  or  sums  of)  concrete  entities  –  and,  in 
particular, not with any of the physical entities mentioned above. One main reason for this is 
that the relevant concrete entities are not to be individuated in relation to their special causal 
origin  in  events  of  sound  production.  For  any  particular  vibrations,  waves,  and  so  on, 
occurring  as  part  of  an  event  of  (re)producing  certain  sounds  could  have  occurred  in  a 
different  context  –  say,  of  the  (re)production  of  other  sounds  (as  suggested  by  the 
resemblance example above), or of events which are not sound (re)productions at all.21 The 
20 There are other reasons why sounds, so understood, should not be taken to be (mere groups of) 
properties. They cannot be identified with any (group) of the qualitative properties of the physical 
entities  and  auditory  experiences  concerned,  given  that  sameness  in  the  respective  physical  or 
experiential qualities is compatible with distinctness in sounds, and vice versa. Sounds can also not 
be identified with the property of being linked, in the right kind of way, to a certain event of sound 
production.  For,  after  all,  sounds  do  possess  some qualitative  properties  (such  as  timbre,  pitch, 
volume,  etc.),  but  their  historical  relations  do  not.  And  sounds  cannot  be  identified  with  any 
(temporal) complex or collection, that includes both some qualitative properties and special relation 
to the event of original sound production, because this would render the perceivability of sounds 
indirect. For the qualitative properties are only contingently exemplified by the sounds; but we can 
perceive only these qualities. What is crucial again is that the qualitative sameness is compatible with 
numerical distinctness.
21 Only the initial event of sound production itself may be said to be individuated by such a special link 
to itself (though not a causal one). But if sounds were identical with such events (and not even with 
events of reproduction), we could not access them by listening to reproductions of sounds. And it 
would be unclear in which sense we would still have events producing the sounds.
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other important fact speaking against the identification of sounds with concrete entities is the 
multiple  realisability  of  the  former.  If  they  were  identical,  say,  with  particular  events  of 
vibrating,  or  with  particular  waves,  different  people  could  not  hear  the  same  individual 
sounds  by  simultaneously,  but  independently  listening  to  distinct  recordings  of  the  same 
concert.22 And if they were identical, say, with the collections of all such current (or even also 
past and future) vibrations or waves, we would always hear only part of them, and they would 
constantly change each time one of their members comes into or goes out of existence (or be 
hardly ever complete if they include all the relevant past and future physical entities as well). 
Instead,  what  the  features  of  sounds  mentioned  suggest  is  that  they  are  identical  with 
temporal universals which are (partly) individuated in terms of the right kind of link to events 
of sound production. These individual sound universals are at least multiple realisable by the 
physical entities involved in the (re)production of sounds, in the sense that they can occur and 
be heard only via these physical entities. However, this dependence of the sounds, understood 
as such individual universals, on the physical entities need not amount to anything stronger – 
in particular not to a partial constitution of the former by the latter. For in the case of such a 
constitution, and due to the multiple realisability of sounds, the same problems would arise as 
with the identification of sounds with the concrete physical entities. As a consequence, sounds 
are best taken to be independent enough of their physical realisers to be able to exist without 
actually being realised – as long as there is at least the possibility of such a realisation. That 
is,  sounds  continue  to  exist  during  intervals  with  no  events  of  corresponding  sound 
(re)productions,  as  long  as  the  possibility  of  the  occurrence  of  such  events  still  obtains. 
Hence, the individual universals identical with sounds are characterised by their dependence 
on the respective possibilities of  sound reproduction.  We have access  to  these sounds by 
means of having access to their realisers.23 And which physical entities count as realisers of a 
sound, and of this rather than that sound, is a matter of whether they stand in the required 
causal link to the relevant original event of sound production. 
But how close are these individual sound universals to types or kinds? It might be thought 
that the physical entities realising the sounds are indeed literal instances or exemplifications, 
and the sounds temporal and 'individualised' or 'particularised' types or kinds. However, just 
as noted above, there still seems to be crucial differences between how we understand types 
22 Note that the term 'recording' is ambigous. Here, it is meant to refer to the concrete 'records', such 
as magnetic tapes or similar objects in other media. But these distinct 'records' are still related to the 
same 'recording' in the sense of the same process of recording.
23 How these two forms of access are related to each other, and which of them should count as auditory 
perception, is a matter of further discussion (cf. Nudds (2007)). There is, however, an initial problem 
here. On the one hand, since we take ourselves to be able to hear sounds in a direct or non-mediated 
way, it would be desirable to classify them, and not the physical entities, as our objects of auditory 
perception (cf. similar challenges to sense-data theories). But since we also take perception to be 
caused by their objects, the physical entities, and not the sounds realised by them, seem to be the 
best candidates. So it appears that any view, which understands sounds as temporal universals, has 
to accept some kind of revision of our common sense opinion about our access to sounds. But this 
problem is a much more general one and not specific to the ontology of sounds: it presumably arises 
with all other 'perceivable' universals.
17
or kinds and how these individual universals should be understood. What is again important 
here is that whether certain physical entities realise sounds and bring us into contact with 
them is entirely a matter of their causal history, and not a matter of the sharing of qualities, 
either with the sounds itself, or with other realisers.24 It is true that all occurrences of a given 
sound  share  the  property  of  causally  deriving  from  a  particular  event  of  initial  sound 
production.  But  sounds  are  clearly  not  identical  with  properties  of  this  sort.  And  these 
properties also cannot define, or correspond to, sounds understood as types or kinds. For the 
idea of types or kinds seems to be inseparably linked to the idea of non-historical and non-
spatio-temporal qualities. Concrete entities count as examples of types or kinds by sharing 
certain such qualities with them; and the respective types or kinds differ among themselves in 
the  qualities  to  which  they  are  so  related  (cf.  Wollheim (1980),  Wolterstorff  (1980),  and 
Rohrbaugh (2003)). The relation of instantiation or exemplification characteristic of types or 
universals seems therefore to be distinct from the relation of causal or historical dependence 
characteristic  of  individual  universals such as  sounds.  However,  this  means to accept  the 
existence  of  what  I  would  like  to  call  prototypes: temporal  universals  that  differ  from 
properties,  kinds  or  types  in  the  way  in  which  they  are  individuated  and  relate  to  their 
concrete realisers.25
9. Sounds as temporal dependants
But sounds, if taken to be temporal and, in some sense, multiply realisable, may perhaps be 
understood in a different way. With respect to properties, such a different understanding of 
their seeming multiple realisability has recently gained weight. The idea is, of course, to treat 
properties as tropes, rather than as temporal or non-temporal universals (along the lines of, 
say, Platonist or Aristotelian views). Tropes are what I would like to call  dependants. Such 
dependent  entities  are  characterised  by  the  fact  that  their  existence  depends  on  the 
simultaneous existence of other entities: they exist only if, and maximally as long as, these 
underlying entities exist. The simultaneity requirement is needed to exclude cases of (mere) 
causal dependence. In some sense, all caused entities depend for their existence on what has 
caused  them.  But  the latter  need not  to  remain  in  existence for  the  former to  do so.  In 
contrast,  the  existence  of  dependants  –  such  as  tropes  –  requires  the  simultaneous  and 
ongoing existence of what they are dependent on. 
24 Note, again, that, while all realisers of a given sound ultimately causally derive from the same event 
of initial sound production, 
25 I prefer not to call them simply 'abstract individuals' because types and kinds can be 'individual' in 
enjoying continuing existence and possessing determinate individuation conditions as well and might 
therefore also count as 'abstract individuals'. And 'abstract particulars' migth wrongly suggest that 
they are not really universals, that is, multiply realisable. However, there is another sense in which 
prototypes, but not types or kinds, are 'individual': if the latter is taken to highlight the fact that what 
individuates  the  respective  entities  are  not  their  qualities,  but  their  historical  properties  (cf. 
Rohrbaugh (2003)).
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In the case of tropes, the respective underlying entities – or bearers – are concrete entities. 
One consequence of this is that they are temporal dependants, given that their bearers show 
temporality.  Another  is  that  tropes  differ  from  their  bearers  on  which  they  depend.  In 
particular, they are not (normal) concrete entities which could exist on their own.26 And a 
third consequence is that tropes, understood as existentially dependent on concrete entities, 
differ from universals in that they are not multiply realisable. Since particular tropes depend 
on their particular bearers, they cannot have more than one bearer, or a different bearer than 
they actually have. 
Now, tropes are grouped together, or distinguished from each other, in relation to whether 
they resemble each other.27 For example, two 'red' objects possess tropes of the same sort and 
therefore count both as 'red' because of the resemblance between the two respective tropes. 
And, in this sense, 'redness' can be multiply realisable – or, since there is, strictly speaking, no 
such thing as a multiple realisable 'redness' any more, we treat the objects in question as if 
they would instantiate the same universal 'redness'.  This approach thus involves a slightly 
revisionary  view  on  what  it  means  for  multiple  realisability  to  occur,  but  it  may  be 
advantageous in other respects – such as the sparseness of the ontological categories needed 
to be postulated.
But the multiple realisability of sounds cannot be treated in the same way, since resemblance 
does not matter for the individuation of sounds. Instead, their specific origin does; and the 
respective temporal dependants may be grouped together, or distinguished from each other, 
in  relation  to  whether  they  ultimately  stem  from  the  same  particular  event  of  sound 
production.  Sounds,  understood  as  such  temporal  dependants,  cannot  depend  for  their 
existence on the simultaneous existence of the original event of sound production, given that 
they we can reproduce and hear them long after the end of this event. Hence, the existence of 
sounds should instead be taken to be dependent on the simultaneous existence of some of the 
physical entities significantly involved in their (re)production. And this kind of dependence 
can take on at least two different forms. First, the physical objects or events in question may 
partly  constitute  the  sounds.  Or,  second,  the  physical  entities  may  bear  the  sounds  as 
dependent constituents (similar to tropes which partly constitute their bearers). In both cases, 
sounds do not exist if they are not currently (re)produced. But it is possible that sounds of the 
same sort – that is, stemming from the same initial event of production – may 'reoccur', as 
long as the possibility of reproduction obtains. 
26 The situation is perhaps a bit more complicated here. On the one hand, concrete entities may be 
dependants themselves – though in a different way than tropes – in that they may, understood as 
wholes, existentially depend on certain of their parts. However, tropes do not have their bearers as 
parts and therefore still differ from such dependent concrete entities with respect to the dependence 
relation in question (independent of  whether best to specify  this difference).  On the other hand, 
concrete entities – that is,  the bearers of tropes – may consist in nothing more than a bundle of 
tropes. But again, bearers and tropes differ, this time relative to the former's inclusion of a bundling 
relation.
27 I aim to stay neutral here on whether tropes of the same sort resemble each other perfectly, or only 
sufficiently more than tropes of other sorts.
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However,  it  becomes  obvious that  this  treatment  of  sounds  inherits  the revisionary move 
noted above. For, according to the proposal, when listening to a concert and to recordings of 
it, we do not really listen to the same, multiply realised individual sound. Instead, we hear 
numerically distinct sounds – albeit sounds which have the same special kind of causal origin 
in a particular event of sound production. But treating sounds as temporal dependants may 
seem implausible for another reason. While it is true that sounds cannot be heard if they are 
not currently (re)produced, and that they become lost once all means of reproduction cease to 
exist, it is not clear that sounds go out of existence during the intervals in which they are not 
actually (re)produced. In some important sense, if the record is lying in one's rack, the sounds 
stored on it seem to be still there, even if the record is not played; they just cannot be heard 
at the moment. The same line of reasoning cannot be upheld with respect to tropes. If there 
are  currently  no  red  objects,  that  is,  no  red-tropes,  there  is  also  no  'redness'.  And  this 
difference may be explained by reference to the fact that sounds, but not tropes, are identified 
and individuated by reference to their origin. The idea is that the existence of sounds – in 
contrast to their occurrence and hearability – requires nothing more than the possibility of 
their reproduction. And indeed, it becomes unclear which further condition on their existence 
could ensure that they in fact exist only when they are actually (re)produced. Hence, it seems 
much more plausible to treat sounds as genuinely multiply realisable temporal universals, 
rather than as only seemingly multiply realisable temporal dependants.
One consequence of these considerations is that Alward's recent proposal of how to treat 
pieces of music seems slightly misguided.28 According to Alward's theory, pieces of music are 
concrete and continuously existing entities. More specifically, they are comprehensive events 
which are constituted by the initial event of composition and any appropriately causally linked 
performances of the composed piece. But although he maintains that this view is capable of 
explaining why pieces of  music  can have multiple  occurrences,  this  does not  seem to  be 
literally true. Of course, the comprehensive event in question may include many different 
concrete occurrences of the musical work. But given that this work is taken to be identical 
with the total event, none of these concrete performances may count in any meaningful sense 
as realising the whole piece of music just by itself. However, it seems that our talk of pieces of 
music as multiply realisable – just as our talk of novels as multiply realisable – expresses just 
this  idea  of  their  possibly  being  'wholly  present'  in  each  of  their  simultaneous  or  non-
simultaneous concrete realisations. So, again, we seem to have a revisionary and weakening 
reading of what it means for artworks to be multiply realisable. Besides, Alward's view faces 
other objections. Most importantly perhaps, it is again unclear when, or how, pieces of music 
may cease to exist. Taking the idea of a comprehensive event seriously seems to suggest that 
it fully exists only as long as all its constituents exist. But this would mean that pieces of 
28 Interestingly,  both  he  and  Nudds  (2007)  refer  back  to  Kaplan  (1990),  when  developing  their 
ontologies of pieces of music and sounds, respectively, but draw very different conclusions from it: 
while Alward treats pieces of music as concrete events, Nudds treats sounds as multiply realisable 
universals with a temporal and 'particular' or 'individual' aspect.
20
music hardly ever wholly exist – and surely stop to do so once the initial performance has 
finished.
10. Novels as prototypes
Now, the evolved picture of sounds may be used as an inspiration for an account of novels 
(and  similar  artworks).  For  the  central  observations  made  with  respect  to  sounds  apply 
equally to novels.29 Distinct particular reproductions may bring us into contact with one and 
the same novel. If we read30 a copy of a novel, which has been printed on the basis of a certain 
original  manuscript,  we  read  the  same  individual  novel  as  someone  who  reads  this 
manuscript.  And, of course, different people may read the same novel by reading reading 
different copies of it. Moreover, if two subjects read copies, which stem from different and 
independent acts of writing and original manuscripts, they read numerically distinct novels. 
And finally, the various copies of novels need not resemble each other in all – or even very 
many  –  qualitative  aspects:  they  may  differ  in  layout,  size,  material,  spelling,  spelling 
mistakes, order of sections (as with the different versions of Fitzgerald's Tender is the Night), 
number and length of sections (as with the different versions of Keller's Der grüne Heinrich), 
and in many other aspects of content (as with. the many different versions of  Ulysses). In 
contrast,  the copies of  two independently written novels may indeed resemble each other 
perfectly in all their linguistic and material qualities.
Consequently, it seems justified to conclude that novels share the essential features of sounds 
noted above.  That is,  novels are also essentially:  (i)  individuals and to be individuated by 
reference to their origin in particular events of writing; (ii) intimately connected to certain 
concrete entities (i.e., their copies) in that they are reproducible and accessible only in the 
shape of those entities; (iii) multiply realisable by such entities; and (iv) temporal in that they 
come into existence and may go out of  existence,  relative to whether there are currently 
copies, or at least the means to produce copies, of them. Hence, given that sounds are best 
understood as prototypes because of their possession of these features, novels should be best 
understood in this way, too. And this ontological view on novels can indeed capture of the 
essential features of novels noted towards the beginning of this essay. Their temporality and 
multiple realisability have already been mentioned. As a direct consequence, the account gets 
also  their  individuality  and  individuation  and  persistence  conditions  right:  novels  are 
29 The main differences between sounds and novels  –  that copies of novels are spatio-temporal 
concrete entities, while occurrences of sounds are only temporal concrete entities; and that 
they are (re)produced and experienced in very different ways – do not seem to matter here.
30 In  the  light  of  the  fact  that,  while  copies  of  novels  are  perceivable,  but  the  novels  themselves 
presumably not (but instead only graspable or understandable),  it  would be more appropriate to 
restrict the notion of reading to the denotation of our complex form of access to novels; while that 
component of this complex form of access, which consists in the perceptually based interaction with 
the  copies,  should  be  labelled  differently  (e.g.,  as  a  special  sort  of  perceptual  experience),  to 
emphasise the difference.  
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individuated in terms of the events of writing from they originate; and they enjoy continuous 
existence as long as it is possible to produce copies of them (which count as copies by being 
produced in a way which derives in the right way from the original act of artistic creation). 
And novels, understood as prototypes, are accessible by means of our perceptual access to 
their realisers, that is, their concrete copies.
The detour  via  sounds has had two important benefits.  First,  it  has helped to  clarify  the 
ontological  category under  which novels fall  if  they really are as the core aspects  of  our 
ordinary understanding of them suggest. And second, it has illustrated that the introduction of 
this rather seldomly acknowledged or accepted ontological category is motivated by more 
than the need to accommodate novels and similar repeatable forms of art. For its assumption 
seems also required to properly capture the nature of sounds and, presumably, many other – 
and predominantly social or cultural – sorts of entity, such as laws, institutions, inventions, 
etc. (cf. Thomasson (1999) and (2004), and Rohrbaugh (2003)). Consequently, there are two 
good reasons to accept the existence of prototypes: that is, of entities which are temporal and 
multiply realisable by concrete entities, and which are not defined in terms of qualities shared 
by them and their realisers, but instead in terms of their origin in certain acts of creation. The 
first reason is that all other plausible ontological views would seem to be in tension with our 
ordinary understanding of novels. And the second is that there are many other sorts of entity 
of which the same is true. We need, it seems, to accept individual universals to satisfactorily 
account for novels, sounds, and the like.
But let me briefly return to the question of whether the features, which I have taken to be 
essential  to  novels  and  which  have  been  causing  so  much  troubles  for  the  alternative 
conceptions (notably the one identifying novels with types or kinds), are indeed essential to 
novels. In particular, are novels really temporal and multiply realisable in the way described? 
The denial of this seems implausible, ad hoc and, to some extent, unnecessary. 
It seems implausible for the reasons already mentioned:  Ulysses did not exist before Joyce 
was born; many people can read Ulysses at the same time, but independently of each other 
and by means of different copies of the novel; and a binary file stored on a disc suffices for the 
existence of a novel, even though it does not itself count as a copy of the novel, given that it 
cannot be read (though it can be used to reproduce a copy, say, on a computer screen). 
But the denial of the essentiality of the features of novels under discussion seems also ad hoc. 
For it does not really appear to address and try to resolve the central ontological problem – 
namely that of explaining how novels can be both multiply realisable and temporal in the 
specified manner – but instead seems to ignore it, or at least try to talk it away. It is indeed 
easy to 'resolve'  the tension with more traditional  ontological  catgories (such as types or 
kinds) by rejecting the special temporality or the multiple realisability of novels, and so to 
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'remove' those features which are in part responsible for the occurrence of the tension in the 
first place. But if it is too stand up to scrutiny, it has to be very well motivated. But both the 
just  noted  implausibility  of  the  denial  of  the  respective  features  of  novels  and  the 
considerations, presented at the beginning of the essay, in favour of the primacy of the core 
aspects of our understanding of novels over any ontological commitments indicate that the 
denial is unlikely to be supplemented with proper legitimation. 
And, finally, this denial seems unnecessary because the proposed alternative, which assumes 
prototypes, promises to be satisfactory. Of course, there are many serious challenges to the 
assumption of  universals  in general  –  that  talk about  them can be reduced to  talk about 
concrete entities; that supposed our non-perceptual (though perceptually mediated) grasp of 
them remains mysterious;  or that their  lack of causal  efficaciousness disqualifies them as 
really existing entities. But these general problems aside31, the main objection to the proposed 
view  is  presumably  that  it  posits  one  ontology  category  too  many.  But  I  hope  that  the 
preceding discussions of sounds and novels have made plausible that this is not obviously so. 
If sounds and novels indeed possess the essential features outlined, then we should better 
accept that there are not only concrete entities and types or kinds (or tropes, for that matter), 
but also prototypes (or perhaps their corresponding 'nominalisations').  In this respect,  the 
middle-sized  material  objects  accepted  by  common-sense  and  the  micro-physical  entities 
posited  by  physics  are  not  privileged  over  artworks:  the  existence  of  all  of  them,  and 
especially their ontological consequences, should be taken equally serious.32
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